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Chapter *** 




This chapter consists of a series of reflections on widely endorsed claims about Christian 
philosophy and, in particular, Christian philosophy of religion. It begins with consideration of 
some claims about how (Christian) philosophy of religion currently is, and then moves on to 
consideration of some claims about how (Christian) philosophy of religion ought to be. 
 
The Triumphalist Narrative 
An oft-told triumphalist narrative holds that we are currently in a golden age for Christian 
philosophy of religion. While the details of the narrative vary, the central thread is that the 
bad old days have been replaced by good times. In the bad old days, philosophy of religion 
was in the doldrums, Christian philosophers were not pursuing philosophy of religion, 
Christian philosophers were hiding their Christian credentials under a bushel, Christian 
philosophers were held in contempt by ‘establishment’ philosophers, philosophy of religion 
had low status, philosophy of religion was not published in high-status generalist journals, 
philosophy of religion had no presence in major philosophy conferences, major presses were 
not taking on books in philosophy of religion, and philosophy of religion was not being 
taught in the higher education sector. But good times have returned: philosophy of religion is 
booming, Christian philosophers are pursuing Christian philosophy of religion, Christian 
philosophers are proudly proclaiming their Christianity to the academy and the world at large, 
philosophy of religion has high status, philosophy of religion is published in high-status 
generalist journals, philosophy of religion has a significant presence in major philosophy 
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conferences, major presses are publishing loads of books in philosophy of religion, and 
philosophy of religion is widely taught in the higher education sector. 
Dating of the bad old days varies. For some, it is the period between the cessation of 
hostilities in World War II and the end of the baby boom. For others, it is a period of 
indeterminate commencement that ends with the 1950s, or the 1960s, or the 1970s, or the 
1980s. Some take particular events to mark the ending of the bad old days: the publication of 
Plantinga’s God and Other Minds (1967); the formation of the Society for Christian 
Philosophers (1978); the giving of Plantinga’s ‘Advice to Christian Philosophers’ (1983). 
Diagnosis of what caused the bad old days to be bad also varies. Some take it to be the 
baleful influence of the Vienna Circle’s logical positivism, and, in particular, widespread 
acceptance of verificationism. Some take a longer perspective, attributing the badness to the 
widening entrenchment of materialism, empiricism, scientism and naturalism in the academy. 
Others point the finger at trends and developments in theology in the twentieth century. 
Craig (n.d.) provides a representative narrative. He starts with a quote from Plantinga (1990): 
‘The contemporary western intellectual world … is ... an arena in which wages a battle for 
men’s souls’. Craig then says: 
 
In recent times, the battlelines have dramatically shifted. … Undoubtedly the most 
important philosophical event of the twentieth century was the collapse of the 
verificationism that lay at the heart of scientific naturalism. … The collapse of 
verificationism brought with it a … disillusionment with the whole Enlightenment 
project of scientific naturalism. … In philosophy the demise of verificationism has been 
accompanied by a resurgence of metaphysics, … the birth of a new discipline, 
philosophy of religion, and a renaissance in Christian philosophy. … Since the late 
1960s, Christian philosophers have been out of the closet and defending the truth of the 
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Christian worldview with philosophically sophisticated arguments in the finest 
scholarly journals and professional societies. … Today, philosophy of religion 
flourishes in young journals … not to mention the standard non-specialist journals. … 
Philosophy departments are a beachhead from which operations can be launched to 
impact other disciplines at the university for Christ. (Craig, n.d.) 
 
Plantinga’s ‘Advice to Christian Philosophers’ begins with a very similar account: 
 
Christianity, these days, and in our part of the world, is on the move. … Thirty, or 
thirty-five years ago, the public temper of mainline establishment philosophy in the 
English speaking world was deeply non-Christian. Few establishment philosophers 
were Christian. … There are now many more Christians, and many more unabashed 
Christians in the professional mainstream of American philosophical life. For example, 
the foundation of the Society for Christian Philosophers … is both an evidence and a 
consequence of that fact. (Plantinga 1984, p. 254) 
 
Although this narrative is oft-told, I am sceptical that it stands up to scrutiny.1 In particular, I 
suspect that this narrative is written without sufficient consideration being given to what the 
world was actually like in ‘the bad old days’ and how it has changed since then. Plantinga’s 
‘thirty to thirty-five years’ identifies the period 1948-1953. What was the state of the world in 
1948-1953, and how does it compare with, say, 2008-2013? What was the state of academic 
philosophy in 1948-1953, and how does it compare with, say, 2008-2013? 
 
Some Relevant Data 
 4 
In 1953, 91% of Americans were Christians; in 2015, 70% of Americans are Christians. In 
1953, a negligible percentage of Americans were religiously unaffiliated; in 2015, 23% of 
Americans are religiously unaffiliated, and 7% of them are atheists or agnostics. In 1953, 
Eisenhower joined the Presbyterian Church, not because he was himself a religious believer, 
but because he held that some form of piety was appropriate in a President. In 1954, “Under 
God” was added to the pledge of allegiance. Eisenhower said: ‘Our government makes no 
sense unless it is founded on a deeply felt religious faith—and I don’t care what it is’ (Henry 
(1981, p. 41). The 1950s saw a marked increase in church membership: only 49% of 
Americans were church members in 1950, while 69% of Americans were church members in 
1960. Since 1960, church membership in the United States has been in steady decline. These 
observations and figures alone suggest that it is pretty implausible to suppose that Christians 
have made significant gains in academic philosophy in the United States in the period from 
1950 to the present. 
In the period from 1948 to 2015, the US population has more than doubled: 151 
million in 1950, and 308 million in 2010. Moreover, in that same period, then has been a 
fourfold increase in undergraduate participation, and a tenfold increase in postgraduate 
participation. Specifically in higher education, in 1950, there were 432,000 BAs and 6600 
PhDs; in 2010, there were 1,600,000 BAs and 67000 PhDs. In 2015, there are around 400 
universities and colleges—20% of the total—that have religious affiliations; and there are a 
further 200 seminaries in which philosophers are employed to teach philosophy. I have been 
unable to find corresponding figures for 1950, but you can be sure that there were many 
fewer universities and colleges—and you can also be pretty sure that the percentage with 
religious affiliations was not any lower. These figures indicate—what was anyway obvious—
that, in the United States, population, access to higher education, employment opportunities 
in universities, and so forth have grown at a much faster rate than the decline in participation 
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in the Christian religion. In absolute terms, by a very considerable margin, there are more 
Christians in the academy now than there were in 1950, even though, in relative terms, there 
are fewer Christians in the academy now than there were in 1950. 
According to Gross and Simmons (2008)—who conducted a large-scale survey of 
academics by discipline (but not including philosophers)—20% of academics are agnostics or 
atheists (but 36.6% of academics in ‘elite doctoral universities’ are agnostics or atheists); 
35.7% of academics have no doubt that God exists (but only 20.4% of academics in ‘elite 
doctoral universities’ have no doubt that God exists); 61% of biologists are atheists or 
agnostics; 63% of accountants have no doubt that God exists; 33% of believers are ‘born 
again’, and most of those are politically conservative. According to the PhilPapers survey of 
academic philosophers—which is not as methodologically rigorous as the survey conducted 
by Gross and Simmons—62% are atheists, 11% lean towards atheism, and 5% are agnostic.2 
While there is clearly room for a methodologically rigorous study that includes philosophers, 
it is worth noting that there is nothing in the data that we do have that suggests that 
philosophy has been transformed into a stronghold for Christians in the academy. 
Membership in the American Philosophical Association has grown exponentially. In 
1920, the APA had 260 members; in 1960, it had 1500 members; in 1990, it had more than 
8000 members. In 1920, one in 407,000 Americans was a member of the APA; in 2000, one 
in 31,000 Americans was a member of the APA. There has been a similar growth in the 
introduction of new journals [in the UK, the US and Canada] in philosophy. In the period 
from 1900 to 1950, there were 30 new journals; between 1950 and 1960, there were 15; 
between 1960 and 1970, there were 44, and between 1970 and 1990, there were 120. In the 
period between 1953 and 2013, there were dramatic improvements in travel and 
communication. In 1953, it was not possible for any academic philosopher to attend very 
many conferences, and rates of communication between academic philosophers were set by 
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postal services; in 2013, cheap air travel, the internet, mobile phone technology, and a host of 
other innovations enabled academic philosophers to attend lots of conferences and 
workshops, and facilitated instant group conversations between philosophers in all parts of 
the planet. Given all of these developments—and given the absolute increase in numbers of 
Christian philosophers in the United States—it would be astonishing if Christian philosophers 
in the United States had not managed to establish some new societies, found some new 
journals, and run some new conferences and workshops in that period. 
Craig gives an indicative list of the ‘young journals’ in which he claims that 
philosophy of religion is flourishing: the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 
Religious Studies, Sophia, Faith and Philosophy, Philosophia Christi and the American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. It is worth considering a longer list, with information 
about start and end dates. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly was launched in 1927 
as New Scholasticism, and was rebadged in 1990. Modern Schoolman first appeared in 1925, 
and was rebadged as the generalist Res Philosophica in 2013. Thought was published 
between 1926 and 1992. Tulane Studies in Philosophy appeared between 1952 and 1987. The 
Philosopher was launched in 1949, and folded in 1972. The Thomist was introduced in 1939. 
The Heythrop Journal first appeared in 1960. Sophia was launched in 1962. Religious Studies 
was inaugurated in 1966. The first issue of the International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion appeared in 1970. Since then, we have witnessed the introduction of Faith and 
Philosophy (1984), Philosophia Christi (1999), and Ars Disputandi (2001, rebadged in 2013 
as the International Journal of Philosophy and Theology). Given the runaway explosion of 
philosophy journals in the second half of the twentieth century, the history of specialist 
journals in philosophy of religion is nothing to write home about—and, in any case, the dates 
of the various comings and goings do nothing to support the triumphalist narrative. 
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Has philosophy of religion come to flourish in the ‘standard specialist journals’? Let’s 
consider the journal, Mind. In 1948, Mind ran to 544 pages; by 1953, it had grown to 576 
pages. In 2008, Mind ran to 1168 pages; by 2013, it had grown to 1248 pages. A search on 
the Mind website for articles that mention both God and religion returns 15 articles and 16 
book reviews in the period 1948-1953, and 6 articles and 33 book reviews in the period 2008-
2013. Given that there are now twice as many pages in the journal, a doubling in the number 
of book reviews is no more than maintenance of the status quo. And, more importantly, a 
reduction from 15 to 6 in the number of articles that mention both God and religion is hardly 
what the triumphalist narrative ought to lead one to expect. Of course, I have only provided a 
single datum here; it would be good to have a much more detailed examination of Mind, as 
well as such important journals as Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Review, Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, among others. 
But I do not think that there is any doubt what such an examination would show. 
How do ‘establishment’ universities compare across the two time periods? Consider 
Princeton, for example. In the period 1948-1953, Faculty at Princeton included: Jacques 
Maritain, Walter T. Stace, Walter Kaufmann, Robert Scoon, James Ward Smith, John Rawls 
and Ledger Wood. (Theodore M. Greene departed in 1946, to go to Yale.) Of these, Maritain, 
Stace, and Kaufmann were all major figures in philosophy of religion (as was Greene), and 
Scoon lectured regularly on Aquinas. Maritain published Approaches to God in 1953; Stace 
published Religion and the Modern Mind and Time and Eternity in 1952; Greene published 
‘Christianity and its Secular Alternatives’ in 1946; Kaufmann—who was born Lutheran and 
converted to Judaism at age 11—lost his own faith at the beginning of World War II, but 
published many books about religion in the 1960s and 1970s. Smith co-edited, with A. 
Leland Jamison, a four-volume work on Religion in American Life. I have been unable to 
learn anything about Wood’s views on religion but, even if he had no interest in religion, the 
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department would still have had a very strong focus on philosophy of religion. Not so today. 
While there has been some very recent work in philosophy of religion—e.g. Mark Johnston’s 
Saving God (2009)—and some appointments of Christian philosophers, there is no way that 
Christianity and philosophy of religion were more strongly represented in philosophy at 
Princeton in the period 2008-2013 than they were in the period 1948-1953. 
I have already mentioned that Greene left Princeton for Yale in 1946. Did matters 
stand differently there? The period from 1948-1953 preceded the ‘war of methodology’ that 
plagued the Yale department of philosophy (see Allen (1998)). Leading figures at Yale in this 
period included John E. Smith, Brand Blanshard and Paul Weiss. All three were sympathetic 
to theism; all three wrote extensively on, and were major figures in, philosophy of religion. 
Smith, in particular, maintained close ties with prominent members of the Yale School of 
Divinity, including Richard Niebuhr and Robert Calhoun. Collectively, the Yale Philosophy 
Department in this period was noted for its inclusive treatment of the various established 
traditions in American philosophy: idealism, pragmatism, process philosophy and realism. In 
2015, despite the fact the department of philosophy is much larger, it is arguable that there is 
less philosophy of religion than there was in the period from 1948-1953, and it is quite clear 
that there is a smaller concentration of specialisation in philosophy of religion across the 
members of the department. Perhaps there are more Christian philosophers in 2015—I 
couldn’t find enough data to decide that question—but, even if so, Yale is no more a centre 
for Christian philosophy in 2015 than it was in the period between 1948 and 1953. 
What about Harvard? In the period 1948-1953, it is hard to find much interest in 
philosophy of religion—or much evidence of Christian belief—among the big names at 
Harvard: Willard Quine, Henry Aiken, Donald Williams, Raphael Demos, Morton White, and 
their ilk. Then again, in 2015, there is no mention of philosophy of religion on the page that 
lists the areas of specialisation of current Harvard faculty. 
 9 
There is a task here for anyone who wants to undertake it. In principle, it is possible to 
collect data about areas of specialisation, areas of interest, fields of publication, and fields of 
teaching in US philosophy departments in the periods 1948-1953 and 2008-2013. That data 
could be broken down to paint a picture of how things stood in ‘establishment’ universities 
(whatever they might be), ‘prestigious graduate-degree conferring’ universities (again, 
whatever they might be), other universities and colleges, state universities and colleges, 
universities with religious affiliations, seminaries, and so forth. In the absence of that detailed 
data, I see no reason at all for anyone to accept the claim that philosophy has been 
transformed from a post-war haven for atheists to a contemporary stronghold for Christian 
philosophy. 
So far, we have only considered the United States. But, of course, Anglophone 
philosophy has been practised in many other parts of the world: the UK, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, South Africa, etc. It might be worth giving some attention to the question 
whether we can find support for the triumphalist narrative in data that derives from outside 
the United States. 
 At Federation in 1901, Australia implemented the White Australia Policy. In 1911, 
96% of Australians were Christians. In 2011, 61% of Australians were Christians, 22.3% had 
no religion, and 9.4% were not prepared to disclose any information about their religious 
beliefs. In the period 1948-1953, there were 8 universities in Australia, with 32,000 students. 
In the period 2008-2013, there were 41 universities in Australia, with 1.3 million students. As 
in the US, the demographic data alone suggests that, while the absolute number of Christians 
in the Australian academy has increased significantly, the relative number of Christians in the 
Australian academy has declined across the selected time periods. 
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I have been unable to find historical data about the distribution of religious belief in 
the Australian academy and, in particular, in Australian departments of philosophy. I turn 
instead to anecdote. In 1952, Sydney Sparkes Orr was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy at 
the University of Tasmania, from a field that included Kurt Baier and John Mackie, because 
the Vice-Chancellor, John Morris ‘wanted a sound Christian fellow who would speak out 
against communism and take a stand on moral issues in the community’ (Pybus 1993, p. 
204). Even allowing for the fact that there are three recently established universities in 
Australia that have religious affiliations, I think that it is Paris to a peanut on that there was a 
higher percentage of Christians in departments of philosophy in Australia in the period 1948-
1953 than there was in the period 2008-2013. 
 How have things changed at Oxford? Some of the biggest names at Oxford in the 
period 1948-1953—Alfred Ayer, Gilbert Ryle, John Austin—were not much interested in 
philosophy of religion. But there were other very well-respected philosophers at Oxford at 
this time—e.g. Elizabeth Anscombe and Michael Dummett—who were well-known for their 
public defence of Christian belief. While I do not have to hand a careful comparison of 
Oxford philosophy in the two periods of interest, I am reasonably sure that there has been no 
dramatic upsurge in interest in philosophy of religion or explicit commitment to Christian 
doctrine among Oxford philosophers. 
 Again, there is a task here for anyone willing to undertake it. What we need is data 
about areas of specialisation, areas of interest, fields of publication, fields of teaching, and so 
forth, in Anglophone philosophy departments across the globe in the periods 1948-1953 and 
2008-2013. In the absence of that data—but given everything else that we know about those 
periods, and given the piecemeal and anecdotal evidence that is already available—there is no 
reason at all for anyone to accept the claim that philosophy has been transformed from a post-
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war haven for atheists to a contemporary stronghold for Christian philosophy across 
significant portions of the globe. 
 Of course, even if I am right that the triumphalist narrative is greatly overstated, it 
hardly follows that there is nothing for some Christian philosophers to cherish in the post-war 
trajectory of philosophy. The Society for Christian Philosophers is a significant organisation 
that has played an important role in bringing some kinds of Christian philosophers together. 
Faith and Philosophy is a very good journal that has enabled quality publication by some 
kinds of Christian philosophers; Templeton funding has had a galvanising effect on research 
for some kinds of Christian philosophy of religion; greater visibility in the American 
Philosophical Association has brought some power and influence to some kinds of Christian 
philosophers; and so on. That the demographic and other data leads one to expect these kinds 
of developments does not diminish the achievements of those who participated in bringing 
them about in the form that they actually took. 
 
The Correlative Advice 
In 1983, when the triumphalist narrative was just beginning to gain a foothold, Plantinga gave 
the following advice to Christian philosophers: 
 
Do not rest content with being philosophers who happen, incidentally, to be 
Christians. … Strive to be Christian philosophers [who operate with] integrity, 
independence, and Christian boldness. … The Christian philosopher has a right (I 
should say a duty) to work at his own projects—projects set by the beliefs of the 
Christian community of which he is a part. The Christian philosophical community 
must work out the answers to its questions; and both the questions and the appropriate 
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ways of working out their answers may presuppose beliefs rejected at most of the 
leading centres of philosophy. (Plantinga 1984, pp. 271, 263) 
 
In the present volume, with the triumphalist narrative much more firmly entrenched, Trent 
Dougherty emphasises the continuing relevance of the given advice: 
 
[T]he ‘temper of mainline establishment philosophy in the English speaking world’ is 
still ‘deeply non-Christian’ … (but) there are now at least some ‘establishment’ 
philosophers (who) self-identify as Christian. Few Christian philosophers today hide 
the fact that they are Christians (though they tend to fly a bit under the radar, just to be 
safe), for many (though far from all) it makes a real difference to their practice as 
philosophers. … [But] for the most part, ‘successful’ Christian philosophers these days 
primarily focus on secular projects. I am the first to commend ‘arts for art’s sake’ to a 
reasonable degree, but I do think that Plantinga’s implication of a duty is well-placed. 
For almost a decade after ‘Advice’ was issued, there was a steady stream of anthologies 
collecting work on specifically Christian themes, but then, in the early-to-mid-90s it 
slowed to a relative trickle.  
 
In both cases, the giving of the advice is interwoven with fragments of the triumphalist 
narrative: ‘beliefs rejected at most of the leading centres of philosophy’; ‘now at least some 
‘establishment’ philosophers self-identify as Christian’; etc. I propose to focus on the advice, 
and leave the interwoven elements of the triumphalist narrative to one side.3 In order to bring 
the advice into focus, it may help to reimagine it as advice to Naturalist philosophers, or 
Atheist philosophers, or perhaps even to philosophers in general. 
 
 13 
Here, for example, is a substantial part of the advice that is contained in Plantinga’s talk 
rewritten so that it is simply advice to philosophers at large: 
 
Every philosopher quite properly starts from his or her own pre-philosophical beliefs, 
and presupposes them in his or her philosophical work, even if those beliefs cannot be 
shown to be probable or plausible with respect to premises accepted by all 
philosophers or most philosophers at the great contemporary centres of philosophy. 
 Each philosopher has his or her own questions to answer, and his or her own 
projects; these projects may not mesh with those of other philosophers. Each 
philosopher has his or her own questions, and his or her own starting point in 
investigating those questions. A philosopher is under no obligation to confine his or 
her research projects to those pursued at leading centres of philosophy, or to pursue 
his or her own projects on the basis of the assumptions that prevail there. 
 A philosopher has as much right to his or her pre-philosophical opinion as 
other philosophers have to theirs. Of course, if there were genuine and substantial 
arguments against the opinions of a given philosopher from premises that have some 
claim on that philosopher, then that philosopher would have a problem. But, in the 
absence of such arguments—and the absence of such arguments is typically evident—
each philosopher quite properly starts from what they pre-philosophically believe. 
Of course, a philosopher does have a responsibility to the philosophical world 
at large. He or she must listen to, understand, and learn from the broader 
philosophical community, and he or she must take his or her place in it; but his or her 
work as a philosopher is not circumscribed by what the rest of the philosophical world 
thinks of his or her opinions. I do not mean for a moment to suggest that a given 
philosopher has nothing to learn from philosophers who do not share his or her pre-
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philosophical opinions: that would be foolish arrogance, utterly belied by the facts of 
the matter. Nor do I mean to suggest that philosophers should retreat into isolated 
enclaves, having as little as possible to do with philosophers who do not share their 
pre-philosophical beliefs. Of course not! Philosophers have much to learn from 
dialogue and discussion with dissenting colleagues. All philosophers are engaged in 
the common human project of understanding ourselves and the world in which we 
find ourselves. If a philosopher is doing his or her job properly, he or she is engaged 
in a complicated, many-sided dialectical discussion, making his or her own 
contribution to that common human project. 
Strive to be philosophers who operate with integrity, independence, and 
boldness. A philosopher has a right (I should say a duty) to work on his or her own 
projects—projects set by the pre-philosophical beliefs and values that he or she has 
and which, perhaps, he or she shares with a wider community. A philosopher must try 
to work out the answers to his or her own philosophical questions; and both the 
questions and the appropriate ways of working out their answers may presuppose 
beliefs and values rejected at most of the leading centres of philosophy. (revised 
paraphrase from Plantinga 1984) 
 
The core of this advice, it seems to me, is that you should be authentic: you should embody 
your deepest values and convictions in the life that you lead. Of course, the advice does not 
suppose that authenticity is the only virtue; and nor does it suppose that you cannot revise 
your deepest values and convictions. What the advice does quite properly suppose is that 
inauthenticity is a strike against flourishing: if you are failing to live out your deepest values 
and convictions, then you are not leading a fully flourishing life. 
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One strand of this advice to philosophers is that the projects that you choose to pursue 
should sit well with your deepest values and convictions: you should be taking on projects 
that can be viewed as embodiments of your deepest values and convictions. On this strand of 
the advice, you should not take on projects merely because pursuit of those projects is 
currently fashionable or well-funded, if pursuit of those projects does not embody your 
deepest values and convictions. This strand of the advice seems plausible to me. Pursuit of 
philosophical projects typically requires an investment that will not be sustained by such 
superficial motives. Perhaps the demands of academic life require the occasional 
compromise. But, if you only ever take on philosophical projects simply because they are 
fashionable or well-funded, you will end up very dissatisfied with your lot. 
 Another strand of this advice to philosophers is that the projects that you choose to 
pursue should have their subject matter fixed by your deepest values and convictions, perhaps 
even to the extent that the projects that you choose to pursue are about your deepest values 
and convictions. On this strand of the advice, sometimes—or perhaps even always—you 
should be working on projects that systematise, or extend, or explain, or defend, your deepest 
values and convictions. This strand of the advice seems less plausible to me. I do not deny 
that it is possible for philosophers to end up working on worthwhile projects that systematise, 
or extend, or explain, or defend, their deepest values and convictions. But it seems to me to 
be no more plausible to suppose that philosophers must work on projects that systematise, or 
extend, or explain, or defend, their deepest values and convictions than it is to suppose that 
mathematicians—or physicists, or chemists, or biologists, and so on—must work on projects 
that systematise, or extend, or explain, or defend, their deepest values and convictions. If I 
devote my working life to pure mathematics, it need not be the case that the theorems that I 
derive are systematisations, or extensions, or explanations, or defences of my deepest values 
and convictions; indeed, it is more or less impossible to see how they could be. Rather, the 
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most that is required is that my devotion of my working life to pure mathematics is an 
embodiment or expression of my deepest values and convictions. If I suppose that devoting 
my working life to pure mathematics is not a way for me to genuinely flourish, then I have 
the best of reasons to be looking for something else to do with my working life. 
 Even if you agree with me that much—though perhaps not all—of what Plantinga 
says can be successfully reinterpreted as good advice to philosophers in general, you may still 
think that there is something important that goes missing under this reinterpretation. 
Dougherty and Plantinga both suggest that Christian philosophers have a duty to contribute to 
Christian philosophy, i.e. to working on ‘specifically Christian themes’ and ‘projects set by 
the beliefs of the Christian community’. While the reinterpretation allows that a philosopher’s 
projects might be set by pre-philosophical beliefs and values that he or she shares with a 
wider community, it is the pre-philosophical beliefs and values that are of primary 
significance: that those pre-philosophical beliefs and values are shared with a wider 
community is not essential to the philosophical task. What the philosopher really has a duty 
to do is to try to work out the answers to his or her own philosophical questions; it is just 
good fortune if those philosophical questions turn out to be shared with others. 
 
Christian Philosophy 
In order to think about what ‘Christian philosophy’ might be, it will help to start by thinking 
about what philosophy is. In my view, philosophy is primarily a domain of inquiry or 
discipline: philosophy is the domain of inquiry or discipline that addresses questions for 
which we do not yet know to produce—and perhaps cannot even imagine how to produce—
consensus answers among experts using methods more or less universally agreed by experts. 
All disciplines started out as philosophy: for example, much that now belongs to physics once 
belonged to philosophy. Moreover, all disciplines shade into philosophy: for all disciplines, 
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there are borderline questions for which it is not currently clear whether those questions will, 
in time, come to have consensus answers among experts arrived at through the use of 
methods more or less universally agreed by experts. Some domains that have been subject to 
investigation for thousands of years—metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, 
philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, ethics, aesthetics, 
political philosophy and so forth—remain resolutely philosophical: in these domains, there 
are no agreed answers to the questions that are addressed, and no agreed methods for 
resolving enduring disagreements about the answers to these questions. 
 Given this characterisation of philosophy, there is one obvious way to understand 
what ‘Christian philosophy’ might be: Christian philosophy could be an attempt to address 
questions about Christianity for which we do not yet know how to produce agreed answers 
using any of the other disciplines that might be used in studying Christianity: sociology, 
demography, anthropology, archaeology, history, human geography, religious studies, and so 
forth. However, I do not think that this is a good candidate for the kinds of investigations that 
Plantinga and Dougherty endorse: there is no particularly good reason to think that Christians 
are uniquely well-placed to address questions about Christianity for which we do not yet 
know how to produce agreed expert answers using any of the other disciplines that might be 
used in studying Christianity. 
 We may get closer to what Dougherty and Plantinga have in mind if we consider a 
domain of inquiry in which a range of Christian doctrines are presupposed by all of the 
participants in the domain of inquiry: various Christian doctrines are lodged on the 
‘conversational scoreboard’, and no participants in the domain of inquiry challenge the 
location of these claims on the ‘conversational scoreboard’. It seems clear enough that the 
‘beliefs of the Christian community’ could give rise to questions about Christianity that 
members of the Christian community do not yet know how to produce agreed answers using 
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any of the other disciplines with which they are familiar: and those questions would also 
appear to be good candidates to be questions that belong to ‘Christian philosophy’. 
 Perhaps, however, this suggestion runs afoul of other things that Plantinga and 
Dougherty say. Remember, in particular, that Plantinga says: 
 
[I do not] mean to suggest that Christian philosophers should retreat into isolated 
enclaves, having as little as possible to do with philosophers who do not share their pre-
philosophical beliefs. …. Christian philosophers have much to learn from dialogue and 
discussion with dissenting colleagues. (Plantinga 1984, p. 270) 
 
But a domain of inquiry in which a range of Christian doctrines are presupposed by all of the 
participants in the domain of inquiry is precisely a domain of inquiry that belongs to an 
isolated enclave: if only those who presuppose the given range of Christian doctrines are 
participants in the domain of inquiry, then there is no engagement with those who do not 
share those presuppositions in that domain of inquiry. 
 Would we do better to consider a domain of inquiry in which a range of Christian 
doctrines are taken as antecedents in the conditional questions that frame that domain of 
inquiry? Clearly, we do not have the same worry about isolated enclaves in this case: anyone 
with appropriate interests can participate in a domain of inquiry in which a range of Christian 
doctrines are taken as antecedents in the conditional questions that frame that domain of 
inquiry. But, if it is true that ‘philosophers have much to learn from dialogue and discussion 
with dissenting colleagues’, then, if there is an expectation that non-Christians have a useful 
contribution to make in dialogue and discussion with Christians when a range of Christian 
doctrines are taken as antecedents in the conditional questions that frame the domain of 
inquiry, there is plainly a similar expectation that Christians have a useful contribution to 
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make in dialogue and discussion with non-Christians when a range of non-Christian doctrines 
are taken as antecedents in the conditional questions that frame a corresponding domain of 
inquiry. If ‘Christian philosophy’ is not to be the preserve of an isolated enclave, then 
Christian philosophers have an obligation to be ‘dissenting colleagues’ when it comes to 
‘Naturalist philosophy’, ‘Atheist philosophy’, and the like. 
 If Christian philosophers are to fulfil the obligation to be ‘dissenting colleagues’ when 
it comes to naturalist philosophy or atheist philosophy, they cannot discharge that obligation 
merely by X-splaining naturalism and atheism to naturalists and atheists. (Equally, of course, 
naturalist and atheist philosophy cannot discharge their obligation to be ‘dissenting 
colleagues’ for Christian philosophers by ‘splaining Christian belief to them.)  
 Suppose that a Christian philosopher and a naturalist philosopher are engaged in ‘the 
common human project of understanding ourselves and the world in which we find 
ourselves’. The Christian philosopher embodies a Christian worldview WC; the naturalist 
philosopher embodies a naturalist worldview WN. WC and WN share many propositions in 
common; but there are also many propositions on which WC and WN diverge. One important 
part of ‘the common human project of understanding ourselves and the world in which we 
find ourselves’ is trying to figure out whether one of the worldviews in question is superior to 
the other. One worldview is superior to another just in case the one worldview is more 
theoretically virtuous than the other, i.e. just in case, given that neither worldview lapses into 
some kind of inconsistency, the one worldview makes a better trade-off of explanatory 
breadth and depth against theoretical—ontological, ideological, nomological—commitment 
than is made by the other worldview.  
 Making an evaluative comparison of worldviews is a very demanding project. First, 
we need to have articulations of the two worldviews to the same level of detail and with the 
same level of accuracy. Second, we need to determine whether either of the worldviews fails 
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on its own terms, because it lapses into some kind of inconsistency. Third, if both worldviews 
survive internal scrutiny, we need to determine whether one of the worldviews is more 
virtuous than the other. Because the articulation of worldviews is always incomplete, the 
comparison of worldviews not shown to lapse into some kind of inconsistency is always 
provisional. Moreover, when worldviews are shown to lapse into inconsistency, the 
conclusions to be drawn are typically very modest: the most that is likely to be mandated is 
some minor tinkering (involving a few relatively peripheral propositions). 
 There are various contributions that a ‘dissenting colleague’ can make to the 
development of the worldviews of those with whom he or she disagrees. A ‘dissenting 
colleague’ may find hitherto undetected consequences of a worldview. (Worldviews—like 
commitments, but unlike beliefs—are closed under logical consequence.) A ‘dissenting 
colleague’ may find that a worldview lapses into inconsistency. A ‘dissenting colleague’ may 
note areas where a worldview makes a sub-optimal trade-off between theoretical commitment 
and explanatory breadth and depth. The overwhelmingly likely outcome of any of these 
contributions is to improve the worldviews under examination: the goal of having everyone 
believe the best—one true—worldview is extremely remote because we are so far away from 
being in possession of any serious candidates for best—one true—worldview. 
‘The common human project of understanding ourselves and the world in which we find 
ourselves’ involves much more than the evaluation of Christian, naturalist, and atheist 
worldviews. While there are many different Christian, naturalist, and atheist worldviews, 
there are also many different Jewish worldviews, Buddhist worldviews, Muslim worldviews, 
Hindu worldviews, Jain worldviews, Shinto worldviews, Confucian worldviews, Daoist 
worldviews, indigenous worldviews, and so on. Fulfilling one’s obligation to be a ‘dissenting 
colleague’ requires a preparedness to be a ‘dissenting colleague’ for proponents of a very 
wide range of worldviews. One very good reason for thinking that philosophy of religion is 
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not in a good state at present is that so little of this range of worldviews gets so much as a 
look in. If philosophers of religion were currently making an adequate fist of their role as 
‘dissenting colleagues’, there would be much wider discussion of the full sweep of religious 
worldviews in philosophy of religion than is currently the case. 
I do not think that there is any reason for anyone to look askance at a domain of 
inquiry in which a range of Christian doctrines are taken as antecedents in the conditional 
questions that frame that domain of inquiry: for the investigation of those conditional 
questions to be philosophical, all that is required is that we do not yet know to produce—and 
perhaps cannot even imagine how to produce—consensus answers to those conditional 
questions among experts using methods more or less universally agreed by experts. But, as I 
have noted, there is no reason to single out Christian doctrines for special attention: for every 
worldview, there is a domain of inquiry in which a range of doctrines proper to that 
worldview are taken as antecedents in the conditional questions that frame that domain of 
inquiry. And, if we think that there is ‘a common human project of understanding ourselves 
and the world in which we find ourselves’, then, collectively, we have an obligation to act as 
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Notes 
1 Here are some more examples of the narrative. Long (2000): ‘The climate has changed 
considerably since mid-century. Philosophy of religion is widely considered to be a 
flourishing field.’ Duncan (2007): ‘The dramatic story of the revival of theism in the 
philosophy of religion, one that brought theism from the brink of intellectual annihilation to 
something approaching intellectual respectability in the space of a single generation’. Smith 
(2001:196): ‘Naturalists passively watched … until today … one third of philosophy 
professors are theists’. 
2 See: https://philpapers.org/surveys/ 
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3 It is perhaps worth noting the dates of publication of some of Richard Swinburne’s books: 
Miracles (1989), Responsibility and Atonement (1991), Revelation (1991), The Christian God 
(1994), Providence and the Problem of Evil (1998), The Resurrection of God Incarnate 
(2003). Manifestly, Swinburne’s work on ‘specifically Christian themes’ did not ‘slow to a 
relative trickle in the early-to-mid-nineties’. There are plenty of other works from this period 
that take up specifically Christian themes: consider, for example, Morris (1994). In 1989, at 
the beginning of The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes, Ed Wierenga wrote: 
‘The historical references I cite are mainly to the work of Christian authors. But I hope that 
this does not limit the interest of what follows only to Christians or only to those who taken 
an interest in the “philosophical credentials of the Christian faith”’ (pp. 1-2). Could it be that 
investigating the philosophical credentials of the Christian faith was just as much a thing at 
that time? 
